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Abstract 
What is it that makes a student’s answer correct or incorrect in Religious Studies? In practice, the 
standards of correctness in the RS classroom are generally applied with relative ease by teachers and 
students. Nevertheless, they are problematic. We shall argue that correctness does not come from 
either the students or the teacher believing that what has been said is true. This raises the question: 
what is correctness, if it does not come down to truth? We propose, and examine, three rival 
solutions, each of which, to an extent, rationalises a fairly natural response to the problem. The first, 
the elliptical approach, says that correct contributions have some tacit content: they are elliptical for 
true sentences about beliefs (e.g. a sentence of the form ‘Christians believe that…’). The second, the 
imaginative approach, seeks to replace appeals to truth and belief with an appeal to imagination, 
treating RS as a ‘game of make-believe’ in which teachers and students imaginatively engage with 
certain worldviews. The third, the institutional approach, locates the root of correctness in the 
practices of the RS institution, which include making endorsements of some judgements and not 
others. We show that the first of our proposed approaches encounters a number of significant 
objections. We find the second of our proposed approaches to be better, but the third is the most 
attractive, providing a direct, intuitive and comprehensive route through the problem of correctness. 
 
 
  
The Basis of Correctness in the Religious Studies Classroom 
The question ‘How do you assess that?’ is one with which Religious Studies teachers will be very 
familiar, whether from students who contest that ‘everything is a matter of faith’ or parents who 
question how religion can be something you get right or wrong. But despite such questions, what is 
clear is that there are some standards for what counts as a correct contribution in the RS classroom.1 
To see this, consider the following two sets of sentences: 
Set 1 
Three days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead 
Jesus has fewer arms than Lord Shiva 
God is omnipotent 
The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is the last prophet of God 
Set 2 
Three days after his death, Jesus went to the moon 
Jesus has more legs than Lord Shiva 
God lives in the sky 
The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is the first prophet of God 
                                                                
1
 We take Religious Studies to be the subject which aims to provide students with an understanding of what 
beliefs and practices are involved in particular religious worldviews, and how these worldviews compare to 
one another, without an objective of students acquiring the beliefs and practices of any particular worldview. 
Another name sometimes given to this subject is ‘Religious Education’, but we prefer not to use this term as it 
may invite a reading connoting religious instruction.  
Intuitively, the sentences within Set 1 are correct in a way the sentences within Set 2 are not. 
Moreover, we can agree that Set 1 is correct whilst Set 2 is incorrect regardless of whether we think 
the sentences in Set 1 are true. Even the most staunch atheist would make a distinction between the 
two sets. 
The sentences in Set 1 would be assessed as correct, unlike those in Set 2 (which might make it into 
the exam howlers list). Assessing something as correct can involve deeming it appropriate and 
relevant in the context of the RS classroom, taking it to be a proper thing to say within that context, 
judging it an adequate or good answer, awarding it marks, and so on. But this is independent of 
whether those uttering the sentences, or those assessing them, take them to be true. Suppose a 
teacher thinks that ‘God is omnipotent’ is not true because they believe there is no God. The teacher 
would nevertheless mark this as correct, as opposed to ‘God lives in the sky’, which they would mark 
as incorrect. A pupil who does not believe in Lord Shiva will take there to be no number of legs or 
arms Shiva really has, since really (they believe) Shiva does not exist. Yet there are still correct and 
incorrect things for this pupil to say about Shiva’s legs. Even seemingly uncontentious sentences 
about human behaviour, like ‘Many people in the world worship the Christian God’, are not so 
straightforwardly true as they might seem, since there is extensive debate over whether so-called 
intentional attitudes (those attitudes which are about something or directed on something) require 
the existence of the thing they are about. Worshipping is an example of an intentional attitude, and 
if somebody’s worshipping some thing X requires that there exist an X which is the thing they 
worship, then somebody who denies that X exists should also deny that anybody worships X.2 Thus a 
disbeliever in the Christian God should not, at least not without further argument concerning 
intentionality, take the sentence ‘Many people in the world worship the Christian God’ to be true. 
But they should surely consider it a correct thing to say in class, and no further argument about 
intentionality is needed to establish that. On the other hand, they will presumably consider a 
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 For a recent introduction to this and related issues, see Sainsbury (2009). 
sentence like ‘Many people in the world worship the Queen of England’s teaspoons’ an incorrect 
thing to say. Thus we can judge one sentence to be correct and the other incorrect whilst taking 
both to be untrue. These considerations point towards two apparent conclusions about correctness 
in the classroom. First, the correctness of a sentence in the context of the RS classroom is not 
determined by whether it is true or false. Neither can we establish that something is taken to be true 
on the basis of its being taken to be correct. Correctness and incorrectness are distinct from truth 
and falsity. Second, and relatedly, to judge a sentence to be correct in the classroom is not the same 
thing as believing that sentence.3 
Note that there is no need for anybody in the class to take a particular sentence to be true in order 
for that to count as correct within the class. Take a classroom in which nobody subscribes to the 
religious view being studied; for example, a class where teacher and pupils are all Jewish and are 
studying Christianity. Even if nobody in the class, including the teacher, believes the sentence ‘Three 
days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead’ to be true, still this is a correct thing to say in class 
(unlike ‘Three days after his death, Jesus went to the moon’). 
This leaves us with the question: what is correctness in the context of the RS classroom? As well as 
being philosophically significant in its own right, an answer to this question can inform how 
practitioners (such as teachers, examiners and education policy-makers) think about, justify and 
develop their practices. For it is an essential component of a complete understanding of what 
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 The relationship between truth and correctness is of philosophical interest for a number of reasons. For 
example, we might debate whether the class of truth-bearers is different from the class of correctness-bearers 
– for instance, actions are naturally deemed correct or incorrect, but not true or false. This may lead us on to 
debates about fundamental ontology, concerning whether the structure of the world is fact-like or not. 
However, our present concern is more akin to recent debates concerning fictionalist approaches to various 
subject matters, which attempt to give ways of accommodating the things one wants to say without 
straightforwardly treating them as true. For a critical overview, see Caddick Bourne (2013). 
practices they are engaging in, and what commitments they are making when they endorse 
statements made in the context of the classroom. We shall set out two promising analyses of 
correctness and argue that, despite their initial plausibility, they face significant and telling 
challenges, before developing and defending an alternative position which explains correctness in 
terms of the functioning of an institution. 
 
The elliptical approach 
One possible solution to the puzzle is to say that sentences are correct because they are elliptical 
versions of a true sentence. For example, we might think that when the Jewish pupil says ‘Three 
days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead’, what she says is shorthand for ‘Christians believe 
that three days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead’.4 
This dissolves the problem of how one can take something to be correct without taking it to be true. 
The claim is that correct sentences have some tacit content which makes them true sentences. 
Similarly, incorrect sentences have tacit content which makes them false. For example, ‘Christians 
believe that three days after his death, Jesus went to the moon’ is a false sentence, since Christians 
do not believe that three days after his death, Jesus went to the moon. 
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 There are some contexts in which a question may be asked in the RS classroom which the elliptical approach 
is not designed to capture. A teacher may ask ‘Did Jesus rise from the dead?’ in a context in which what is 
required is for the student to explain their own beliefs and reflect critically on their reasons for these beliefs. 
Whilst correctness in that context is not our primary concern in this paper, the suggestions we make below (in 
‘The institutional approach’) could (unlike the suggestions made by the elliptical approach) be extended to 
encompass what correctness amounts to in this context as well. 
One way of supporting this account may be to note that sometimes prefixes are made explicit in 
class; a student might write or say ‘Christians believe that… ’ in classwork or an exam, and questions 
are sometimes phrased accordingly (e.g. ‘How would Christians respond to the ethical issue of care 
for the environment?’). These ways of explicitly setting the context for what follows – as concerning 
beliefs of certain people – might suggest that there is tacit context-setting going on even when we 
do not make such elements explicit. Additional support comes from cases where an assessor would 
take the addition of an explicit prefix to make no difference to how an answer should be judged. If 
‘Christians believe that Jesus rose from the dead’ is assessed no differently from ‘Jesus rose from the 
dead’ in a certain context, that could lend support to the suggestion that the second is interpreted 
as having the same meaning as the first. 
There is an immediate problem for the elliptical approach, however; specifying what the tacit prefix 
must be. ‘Christians believe that’ is underspecified – does it mean ‘All Christians believe that’, ‘Some 
Christians believe that’, or something else? The former is too demanding – many sentences which 
are correct in the RS classroom will be false if they are to be taken as saying that all Christians 
believe such-and-such. Assuming one can be a Christian and not believe in the literal truth of the 
Resurrection, ‘All Christians believe that Jesus rose from the dead’ can be false despite ‘Jesus rose 
from the dead’ being correct in a classroom context. 
A possible response on behalf of the account is that anyone who does not believe that Jesus rose 
from the dead is not really a Christian. It might be said that subscribing to the Creed is an essential 
part of Christianity, and thus that anybody who does not have the beliefs laid out therein is not 
Christian. As a view of what Christianity is, this is contentious. Many people would think that there 
are sufficient conditions for being Christian which are not overridden by not believing that, say, Jesus 
rose from the dead. Take the case of Maurice Wiles, who rejects the idea of intervention by God in 
the world based on the argument that this would entail a partisan and selective deity (1993). The 
fact that he was a lifelong member of the Church of England, indeed, an ordained Anglican minister 
(in addition to having been Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford), could be taken to be sufficient to 
make it irrelevant to his being a Christian whether he believed that Jesus rose from the dead. 
In any case, there is another reason to reject the response that sentences such as ‘All Christians 
believe that Jesus rose from the dead’ are true by definition. Even if this were the case, it would not 
help us to account for judgements of correctness in the classroom. Plenty of teachers (and pupils) 
who judge ‘Jesus rose from the dead’ to be correct within the RS classroom do not take belief in the 
resurrection to be a necessary condition of being a Christian. Thus, their judgement that ‘Jesus rose 
from the dead’ is a correct thing to say cannot be explained in terms of their taking ‘All Christians 
believe that Jesus rose from the dead’ to be true. To explain judgements of correctness, this version 
of the elliptical approach would require that assessors of correctness in Religious Studies (teachers, 
examiners, etc.) believe the sentence ‘All Christians believe that Jesus rose from the dead’; this is 
clearly too demanding. Moreover, even a teacher who does believe that belief in the resurrection is 
definitional of Christianity need not take this to be the basis for judging ‘Jesus rose from the dead’ to 
be correct in the classroom. Thus, to take the first sentence as elliptical for the second does not 
provide a plausible articulation of the standards of correctness within the classroom which 
practitioners are actually working with. 
To overcome these difficulties, one might try moving to the less demanding reading of the prefix 
‘Christians believe that…’, as ‘Some Christians believe that…’. But this is so undemanding as to be 
too permissive. First, it does not distinguish between relevant and irrelevant beliefs held by some 
Christians. ‘Some Christians believe that Monk is the greatest detective show’ may be true, but this 
does not suffice for ‘Monk is the greatest detective show’ to be correct in the RS classroom. 
Second, even amongst relevant beliefs the prefix is too permissive. Some Christians believe that the 
formation of the Grand Canyon is down to the flood at the time of Noah. But ‘The formation of the 
Grand Canyon is down to the flood at the time of Noah’ would not be a correct thing to say in the RS 
classroom. What it would be correct to say is ‘Some Christians believe that the formation of the 
Grand Canyon is down to the flood at the time of Noah’. But the fact that the sentence is correct 
when the prefix is explicit does not change the fact that it is incorrect when there is no such explicit 
prefix. It is this incorrectness which undermines the proposal that sentences which are correct in the 
classroom are correct because they are elliptical for true sentences of the form ‘Some Christians 
believe that…’. If this were the reason for their correctness, it would also be a reason to take ‘The 
formation of the Grand Canyon is down to the flood at the time of Noah’ as correct, since this, too, is 
something some Christians believe. 
This might prompt a defender of the elliptical approach to look for a middle way between these two 
renderings, construing the prefix as, say, ‘Most Christians believe that…’. But this will not do either. 
Suppose relatively few Christians are aware that the miracles in John are signs that point to religious 
significance beyond the events, whereas the miracles in the Synoptic Gospels show divine power.5 
Nevertheless, saying ‘The miracles in John are signs that point to religious significance beyond the 
events, whereas the miracles in the Synoptic Gospels show divine power’ would be correct in the RS 
classroom, and indeed something on which students could be examined at A Level, when studying 
John’s Gospel.6 
We might try to avoid these problems by modifying the prefix to ‘Many Christians believe that…’. 
Many need not be most – a minority may be many enough. Thus this version of the prefix gives us 
scope to avoid the problem of correct claims which most Christians do not believe because specialist 
study is required in order to form the relevant beliefs. At the same time, ‘many’ is slightly more 
demanding than ‘some’. Nevertheless, this rendering of the prefix still falls foul of the problem of 
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 John’s Gospel would call a miracle a ‘σημείον’ (semeion), a ‘sign’, whereas the Synoptic Gospels describe 
miracles using the word ‘δύναμις’ (dynamis), ‘power’, emphasising the wondrousness of the events over their 
religious significance. 
6
 A Levels are qualifications typically studied at age 16-18 in the UK. 
irrelevance. ‘Many Christians believe that a cup of tea solves everything’ may be true, but if it is that 
does not suffice to make ‘A cup of tea solves everything’ correct in the RS classroom. 
Perhaps this shows that we should restrict ourselves to beliefs which many Christians hold but, 
further, which are acquired in the right sort of way – perhaps from a suitable representative of the 
religion, for example. Thus we might take sentences which are correct in the classroom as elliptical 
for something like ‘Many Christians believe … because a figurehead in Christianity said …’. But this 
does not eliminate the problem of irrelevance. On July 13th 2013 the Daily Mail ran an article with 
the headline ‘The Royal baby will be a drama. But what hope it will bring us, says Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Justin Welby’. If many Christians came to believe, on the basis of the Archbishop’s 
comments, that the Royal baby will bring hope for the future, that still does not suffice to make ‘The 
Royal baby will bring hope for the future’ correct in the RS classroom. (Notice that this is also an 
argument against taking the prefix to be simply ‘Figureheads in Christianity believe…’.)7 
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 In response to the problem of irrelevance, we might construe the elliptical approach as an account of the 
difference between a relevant sentence which is correct and a relevant sentence which is not correct. On this 
construal, the approach would be putting forward a candidate necessary condition of correctness, but would 
not be offering a sufficient condition, since relevance is a further prerequisite of correctness. Another way of 
putting this is to say that it is relevance which determines which of all the true sentences bearing the prefixes 
in question correspond to sentences which are correct in the classroom. But then the elliptical approach gives 
us at best part of the story about correctness, since it leaves untouched the question of what makes a 
sentence relevant. It will not do to respond that correctness is one thing and relevance is quite another. The 
connection between the two is more intimate than that, as evidenced by the fact that a teacher may 
legitimately state ‘This is irrelevant’ as a justification for, say, not awarding a student any marks for an answer. 
One advantage of the positive account we shall propose (in ‘The institutional approach’, below) is that it 
suggests a more unified and integrated approach, explaining the distinction between what is correct and what 
is not in terms which can also be used to characterise the distinction between what is relevant and what is not. 
In any case, classroom discussion of perfectly relevant matters also creates problems, if we take 
correct sentences to be elliptical for true sentences beginning ‘Many Christians believe that…’. 
Consider this exchange: 
 Student 1: What is the Shroud of Turin? 
 Student 2: It’s the cloth Jesus was buried in. 
 Teacher: Wait a minute. It’s not entirely clear what the Shroud of Turin is. 
 Student 2: But many Christians believe it’s the cloth Jesus was buried in. 
 Teacher: Yes, that’s true. But there are also many Christians who reject that claim. 
The teacher’s point is that it is true to say both ‘Many Christians believe that the Shroud of Turin is 
the cloth Jesus was buried in’ and ‘Many Christians believe that it is not the case that the Shroud of 
Turin is the cloth Jesus was buried in’ – indeed, that we should say both if we are to give an accurate 
picture of how things stand on this issue. Many RS GCSE questions are geared towards exactly this 
kind of response, with students often being encouraged to compare opposing perspectives within 
Christianity.8 It certainly would not be correct, though, for the student to write in their essay ‘The 
Shroud of Turin is the cloth in which Jesus was buried. The Shroud of Turin is not the cloth in which 
Jesus was buried.’ Thus the truth of both prefixed sentences cannot suffice for correctness of the 
apparently unprefixed sentences in the classroom: the prefixed sentences are true, whereas to utter 
the two apparently unprefixed sentences together would be judged not just incorrect, but 
borderline nonsense. This shows that this is not simply a case where the prefix ‘Many Christians 
believe that…’ is not made explicit, but rather, a case where no such prefix is tacit either. 
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 GCSEs are qualifications typically studied at age 14-16 in the UK. 
This illustrates that even seemingly relevant beliefs which many Christians hold do not always 
translate into sentences which would be assessed as correct in the RS classroom. Interestingly, it 
would be correct to say ‘There is new evidence that the Shroud of Turin could be around 2000 years 
old.’ The discovery of this evidence made the BBC news, so we could expect that many Christians are 
aware of it. In that case, both ‘Many Christians believe that there is new evidence that the Shroud of 
Turin could be around 2000 years old’ and ‘Many Christians believe that the Shroud of Turin is the 
cloth in which Jesus was buried’ would be true. Thus appealing to the prefix ‘Many Christians 
believe…’ offers no explanation of why ‘There is new evidence that the Shroud of Turin could be 
around 2000 years old’ is correct in the classroom while ‘The Shroud of Turin is the cloth in which 
Jesus was buried’ is not. Further, ‘There is new evidence that the Shroud of Turin could be around 
2000 years old’ would be correct regardless of whether its prefixed version is true. Had the new 
evidence been less widely reported, even to the extent where no Christian is aware of it, a student 
who said ‘There is new evidence that the Shroud of Turin could be around 2000 years old’ would not 
only be saying something correct, but would merit praise for their extra research. 
We have argued that prefixes like ‘All Christians believe…’, ‘Most Christians believe…’, ‘Many 
Christians believe…’ and ‘Some Christians believe…’ do not succeed in providing an analysis of 
correctness in the RS classroom.9 Nevertheless, their relevance in the classroom should not be 
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 Neither, we suggest, will the prefix ‘Traditionally, Christians believe that…’, which was suggested by an 
anonymous referee. An attempt to explicate what this prefix means, in a way which incorporates what is 
correct in the classroom while excluding what is not correct, will take us back to many of the same problems 
for the elliptical approach which we have already identified. If we understand a tradition to be the 
transmission of beliefs and practices from generation to generation, then whose beliefs must be transmitted, 
and how many in the next generation must have a belief for it to count as having been transmitted? How are 
we to demarcate a tradition in order to exclude beliefs which are irrelevant? This is not to overlook the 
overlooked. As the exchange above shows, one way in which somebody might explicitly use such 
locutions is in an attempt to persuade others of the worth of their contribution. Student 2 points out 
that many Christians believe the Turin Shroud to be the cloth in which Jesus was buried partly to 
justify his original contribution (‘It’s the cloth Jesus was buried in’) as having made a worthwhile 
contribution to class discussion. 
This reinforces our argument that tacit prefixes are not part of the meaning of correct sentences. If 
they were, then the student would not be saying anything new by adding explicitly that ‘Many 
Christians believe’ what he or she made explicit the first time around. Rather than providing new 
information to justify his or her original contribution, the student would be providing a redundant 
reiteration of the original contribution. 
Moreover, the material actually covered in RS seems not to be chosen based on representing exactly 
what is in fact practised or believed by particular people. While the material chosen does engage 
with traditions, this cannot simply be reduced to an attempt to represent how people really practise 
or engage with these traditions. A good example of this is the teaching in UK schools about the role 
of the Mikveh, a Jewish ritual bath, which has fallen out of use after menstruation amongst most 
Jewish women in the UK. Students would be assessed as correct if they talked about the role of the 
Mikveh, irrespective of the proportion of Jews for whom this is part of their religious practice. ‘The 
Mikveh is a ritual bath’ would be correct, despite the fact that ‘Many Jews use the Mikveh, a ritual 
bath’ might in fact be untrue. Some10 might contest that RS wrongly ignores the diversity of actual 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
importance of perceptions of what is traditional to determining what is correct in the classroom, as we discuss 
in ‘The Institutional Approach’, below. 
10
 Such as Robert Jackson’s approach which ‘takes a critical stance towards Western, post-Enlightenment 
models of representing world religions as homogeneous belief systems, whose essence is expressed through 
set structures and whose membership is seen in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.’ (2011:191) 
religious practice, but nevertheless, this example is enough to demonstrate that correctness as it 
actually is assessed in the RS classroom comes apart from anthropological claims about how many 
people believe or practise certain tenets or customs of their faith.  
 
The imaginative approach 
The elliptical approach attempts to explain correctness of sentences in terms of corresponding 
sentences which are believed to be true. Perhaps a more fruitful approach would be to abandon the 
idea that correctness in the classroom can be boiled down to truth, and focus instead on something 
different – imagination. 
Kendall Walton has given an influential explanation of fiction in terms of games of make-believe. 
Certain things are true in a game in virtue of what its players do and what their environment is like. 
Take Walton’s example of a game in which we pretend to be in a bear-inhabited forest (1990 ch.1). 
We stipulate that tree-stumps are to count as bears. Wherever there is in actuality a stump, in the 
game there is a bear. The tree-stumps are ‘props’: bits of the actual world which call for the game-
player to imagine certain things (in this case, that there is a bear). 
According to Walton, fictions are props which make certain things fictional according to the game 
played by the audience-member. Sentences of novels, poses of actors on stage, etc., prescribe that 
the audience-member imagine certain things. For it to be fictional that p is for there to be a 
prescription to imagine that p. 
One potential way to address the puzzle of correctness is to extend the idea of games of make-
believe to the RS classroom, making RS a game in which teachers and students imaginatively engage 
with certain worldviews.11 The reason for this move is that it allows us to replace the appeal to truth 
with an appeal to ‘truth in the game’.  It is true in the game that three days after his death, Jesus 
rose from the dead, and this is what makes it correct to say ‘Three days after his death, Jesus rose 
from the dead’ in the RS classroom. 12 
Note that being true in a game is not in conflict with being true in actuality. It is true in the game 
played with the Sherlock Holmes stories that Baker Street is in London – and, of course, Baker Street 
actually is in London. Relatedly, making utterances as part of a game does not require taking them to 
be false. A pupil participating in the game who says ‘Three days after his death, Jesus rose from the 
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 We do not wish to suggest that Walton would himself endorse this extension. Other examples of extensions 
of Walton’s idea of games of make-believe to attempt to understand areas beyond fiction include applications 
to mathematical discourse (e.g. Leng (2010)) and to the use of models in science (e.g. Toon (2010)). 
12
 Some may balk at the use of the word ‘game’ to describe what is going on in the RS classroom. To mitigate 
this, it should be noted that the term ‘game of make-believe’ is drawn from Walton’s canonical work on 
imaginative engagement. What it indicates is that the project one is engaged in, in the RS classroom, is 
centrally one of imagining. Certain connotations which the word ‘game’ may have in other contexts should be 
suspended. For example, to say participants in the RS classroom are engaged in a ‘game’ in this sense is not to 
say that they are doing something the purpose of which is entertainment, nor is it to say that they are not 
taking seriously the worldviews or ideas with which they are imaginatively engaging. It also leaves open 
questions about how the game is to be played – for example, whether certain types of imagination, such as 
empathy, play a special role. Thus the term ‘game’ should not diminish the seriousness with which the 
imaginative approach takes the practice it attempts to characterise. (Likewise for the other extensions of 
Walton’s account mentioned in footnote 11, above.) However, it would be open to a defender of the 
imaginative approach who dislikes the term ‘game’ to replace it with another – perhaps ‘imaginative project’, 
for instance – while retaining the same account of what participation in the RS classroom involves. 
dead’ might also believe the sentence to be true.13 But it seems the pupil does not have to believe 
the sentence ‘Three days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead’ in order to utter it as part of 
playing the game of make-believe. Thus whether something is correct, according to this view, is 
independent of whether or not it is believed. 
This allows the imaginative approach neatly to sidestep many of the concerns with the elliptical 
approach. Although playing the game calls for us to engage imaginatively with certain worldviews, 
truth in the game is not analysed in terms of who believes, or how many people believe, whatever 
content that worldview might have. Thus we avoid the problems, noted above, posed by irrelevant 
beliefs, minority beliefs, and beliefs about obscure matters. 
The imaginative approach also sits well with what appears to be going on when students fail to 
engage in the RS classroom, or, indeed, are offended by being asked to engage. Consider a case in 
the RS classroom where God’s eternity is a point of discussion, and a student’s contribution is ‘God 
doesn’t exist’, beyond which the student refuses to engage further. On the imaginative approach, 
this might be described as a case of ‘imaginative resistance’, where there is a block to somebody’s 
imagining what they are being asked to imagine because they find it difficult to do so. Imaginative 
resistance might arise where somebody cannot imagine what they are being asked to, perhaps 
because they cannot make sense of it. Or it might arise where somebody does not want to imagine 
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 Indeed, there are cases where taking part in a game of make-believe has been deemed inappropriate for 
those who cannot be expected to believe what content it may have – as in those schools who have opted for 
secular Christmas plays over Nativity plays because they are secular establishments. We shall not explore in 
detail how closely the inappropriateness is related to the imaginative activities of the players. Some may deem 
the Nativity play inappropriate precisely because it would call for some pupils to imagine certain things which 
they do not believe. There may also be other factors, such as the fact that portraying the son of God could be 
regarded as blasphemous by some members of the school, or that Nativity plays are simply not part of the 
culture of all members.  
what they are being asked to, and thus finds it difficult to bring themselves to engage. For example, 
a student who thinks a worldview is silly or pernicious may resist playing a game in which that 
worldview is true.14 
Another appealing feature of this approach is that, whilst the elliptical account of correctness 
encouraged us to take each sentence on a case-by-case basis, considering whether it is believed by 
certain people, the imaginative approach is holistic, treating individual sentences as situated within 
the narrative of the whole game. Just as individual beliefs have a place within a worldview, individual 
utterances in the RS classroom have a place within the larger game. 
This also allows us to make better sense of the correctness of inferences in the context of the 
classroom. Students studying resurrection narratives could infer from the story of Jesus’s 
resurrection that, in Christianity, resurrection of the body is possible. Similarly, they might infer from 
‘moksa is the release of the soul’ that, within the Hindu worldview, there is a soul. Asked to describe 
Christian or Hindu understandings of life after death, it would be correct for the student to say 
‘there is resurrection of the body’ or ‘there is a soul’, respectively. The student could be confident 
saying these things because of the inferences they have made from other sentences which they 
know to be correct in the classroom. 
A good account of correctness needs to allow for, and make sense of, this. Here the elliptical 
approach would be of little help. If the correctness of an individual sentence is to be judged by the 
truth of an appropriately related prefixed sentence, the process of inference becomes one of 
hypothesising about what people are likely to believe given the prevalence of other beliefs. 
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 Whilst the imaginative approach therefore has resources to articulate what might be going in some cases of 
disengagement, this is not to say that other approaches could not also be developed to account for 
disengagement.  
For instance, take the student who has learnt about the resurrection of Jesus and, based on this, 
says during a lesson on Christianity that the body can be resurrected. According to the elliptical 
approach, this is correct because it is true that certain people believe that the body can be 
resurrected. Yet it is often unnatural, we think, to describe the inference as an inference from one 
prefixed sentence to another – e.g. from ‘Many Christians believe that three days after his death, 
Jesus rose from the dead’ to ‘Many Christians believe that the body can be resurrected’. The 
inference is from the correct sentence: 
i) ‘Three days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead’ 
to: 
ii) ‘The body can be resurrected’. 
This is quite different from the kind of inference which would take us from (i) to (ii) if they were 
construed as the elliptical approach proposes, namely, from: 
iii) ‘Many Christians believe that three days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead’ 
to: 
iv) ‘Many Christians believe that the body can be resurrected’. 
One important difference is in what goes into establishing whether the inference is a good one or 
not. The standards for the inference from (i) to (ii) are, plausibly, deductive. We are concerned with 
whether the conclusion follows from the premise, in the sense that the truth of the premise would 
guarantee the truth of the conclusion; the student perhaps reasons that for Jesus to rise from the 
dead was for a body to be resurrected, therefore, the body can be resurrected. But in the case of the 
inference from (iii) to (iv), it is far from clear that the truth of the premise is enough to guarantee the 
truth of the conclusion – maybe it is perfectly possible, even if unlikely, for many Christians to 
believe that three days after his death, Jesus rose from the dead without it being the case that many 
Christians believe that the body can be resurrected. Whether the inference from (iii) to (iv) is a good 
one depends on whether, as a matter of fact, the first premise would make the second more likely to 
be true. Putting it another way: for the inference from (iii) to (iv) to be deductive, another premise 
would have to be assumed: that Christians believe the consequences of their beliefs. And to support 
this premise would require either extensive empirical research (or, if not that, extensive 
epistemological theorising), neither of which seems to be the basis on which the inference from (i) 
to (ii) could be made in the context of the RS classroom. 
This points to another crucial difference, namely, the fact that moving from (iii) to (iv) relies on social 
or anthropological considerations. If it were the inference to and from prefixed sentences which 
mattered, then methods of inference in the RS classroom would be very different from those 
actually used. For example, students might have to study psychological and statistical data about 
believers. This does not capture what is in fact their project, namely, piecing together the elements 
of religious worldviews to form a whole. 
Inference has a place in a game of make-believe; what is true in the game is often determined not 
just by things we are told explicitly, but by what can be inferred. From the premise that Sherlock 
Holmes lives in 221B Baker Street, together with the assumption that he has only one dwelling, we 
can infer that Holmes does not live in 221A Baker Street. In the same way, games of make-believe 
are amenable to the inferences actually made in the context of the RS classroom. Unlike the elliptical 
approach, the imaginative approach does not constrain the variety of bases on which correct 
inferences may be made. 
Suppose some students learn that the Sikh holy text is called the ‘Guru Granth Sahib’ because it is 
seen to be a teacher of the faith, hence a Guru. In the course of studying Sikhism, they then come 
across Guru Nanak. They can then incorporate imaginings concerning the role of Guru Nanak into 
their game in a way which fits with what they have been imagining so far, inferring that Guru Nanak 
was also a teacher of the faith. Or suppose a student, having made-believe when learning about 
Christianity that there is a time at which the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall be raised, writes 
in an exam answer ‘the dead shall be raised’. This sentence is entailed by ‘there is a time at which 
the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall be raised’, and, while it might be judged as only 
demonstrating partial understanding of Christian eschatology, would nevertheless be considered 
correct. 
Nevertheless, whilst it provides a framework which makes space for the role of inference in the 
classroom, the idea of make-believe does not, in itself, give us any positive account of what the 
constraints on correct inference are. This begins to reveal the explanatory limitations of the 
imaginative approach. It tells us that games are being played, but gives us no insight into their scope 
or how their rules are established. 
Perhaps the most intuitive approach would be to say that games of make-believe played in the RS 
classroom correspond to the religions being studied – in studying Judaism, for example, students are 
playing the ‘Judaism game’. This might naturally reflect what often happens in the RS classroom, 
where each religion tends to be taught in turn rather than together, with a term or semester playing 
the ‘Judaism game’ being followed by a term or semester playing the ‘Islam game’. 
But if games of make-believe are to be understood as corresponding to a particular religion, the 
imaginative approach faces potential difficulties concerning comparisons and identifications made 
between elements of different religions in the RS classroom, and the inferences these comparisons 
and identifications can give rise to. Take the example of a class studying the role of prophecy in 
Islam, in which a student might say ‘The Prophet Isa is the same person as Jesus Christ’. Such a 
contribution cannot be understood as belonging entirely to the ‘Islam game’, nor entirely to the 
‘Christianity game’. How, then, is the student’s contribution to be construed by an approach which 
takes students in the RS classroom to be participating in games of make-believe? 
Two options suggest themselves. The first is to say that the student is taking an external perspective 
which notes similarities between different games, both of which can be played in the classroom. 
Their comparison should be understood as making an observation along the following lines: what 
one is prescribed to imagine when playing elements of the ‘Christianity game’ is similar in certain 
respects to what one is prescribed to imagine when playing elements of the ‘Islam game’. One 
consequence of this approach is that there is a discontinuity in what we should take people to be 
doing when uttering sentences in the classroom. In a single conversation – perhaps even a single 
sentence – a student may move between participating in games and commenting on what 
participation in those games involves. 
Those who prefer to think there is more unification in how classroom contributions are to be 
construed may prefer the second option, which is to attempt to incorporate comparative and non-
comparative utterances within a single imaginative enterprise by holding that one game can draw in 
elements from the different religions being considered. But delineating the content of such a game, 
and the inferences which may legitimately be made within it, is not a straightforward matter. For 
example, the religions being compared may contradict each other in places, and so we must account 
for what systems of inference are properly used when navigating contradictory elements within a 
single game. ‘Jesus did and did not rise from the dead’ is not necessarily a correct contribution in a 
classroom context where ‘The Prophet Isa is Jesus’ is correct, yet we may legitimately infer the 
former from the latter if we import information about the Prophet Isa and the Christian Jesus into 
the same game and take the rules of the game to be given by classical logic. A version of the 
imaginative approach in which a single game takes elements from different religions must either 
place well-motivated restrictions on what elements of the religion are to be imported, or explain 
what (non-classical) system of inference is appropriate to the game.  
 
The institutional approach 
The imaginative approach has not been conclusively ruled out by the problems we have raised. But 
the challenge for such an approach is to define precisely what a game of make-believe in the RS 
classroom involves; simply saying that correctness amounts to ‘truth in a game’ does not achieve 
this. Perhaps further characterisation of what precisely the game of make-believe comprises could 
be successful; we do not wish to rule this out. (Neither do we wish to rule out that the elliptical 
approach could be made to work, though it would require significant development.) However, we 
think there is a more direct, more intuitive and more informative route through the problem of 
correctness. 
The limitations of the elliptical and imaginative approaches should remind us of what is wanted from 
a good account of correctness in the RS classroom. The account should explain the difference 
between a sentence which is correct and one which is not. It should explain why judging something 
to be correct is distinct from judging it to be true. In order to do either of these things in a 
compelling way, it must also explain where the criteria of correctness come from. Our proposal is 
that the criteria come from a practice: that of teaching, studying and assessing RS in schools. By 
placing the emphasis on the practice itself, we can improve on the elliptical approach by adequately 
capturing and explaining judgements of correctness, and improve on the imaginative approach by 
unifying an answer to the question of what makes correctness different from truth with an 
identification of which particular context fixes the criteria of correctness. 
The starting point of our account is to look at what happens in the RS classroom. Imagine this 
exchange:  
Teacher: What attributes does God have? Let’s make a list on the board. 
Student: Omnipotence? 
Teacher: Yes, absolutely right. What does that mean? 
Student: God is all-powerful. 
In this exchange, the student’s contributions are correct. When he writes them in his homework, he 
will be credited. From this, he will know that these are the kinds of contributions to prepare for his 
exams. Throughout this process, it is the teacher who judges the student’s contributions to be 
correct. 
Nevertheless, the teacher’s judgement cannot suffice for correctness, since we all accept that it is 
possible for teachers to go wrong. For example, if a teacher tells a student that the ‘yad’ is used as a 
pointer when reading the Torah because to touch it directly would be sacrilegious, they would be 
saying something incorrect, as the ‘yad’ is used rather for the practical maintenance of the scrolls. 
The teacher plays a part in a wider community which self-regulates, brings together expertise and 
shares resources in order to keep its members informed. The criteria of correctness therefore go 
beyond what any one individual judges – or rather, in some cases, misjudges – to be correct. 
This community, together with its practices and ways of interacting, we will refer to as the ‘RS 
institution’. The institution includes teachers and examiners (of course, some individuals will have 
both roles). It contains academics who train RS teachers and undertake research in the area. It also 
includes members of the religious groups which inform how teachers and examiners construct 
syllabuses, and what is deemed relevant. In the UK, Standing Advisory Councils for Religious 
Education (SACREs) play this role, chaired by local advisors, employed by local government. 
Students themselves are of course also a part of this institution: they play a part in judging the 
correctness of their peers’ contributions, and could object where a teacher has gone wrong. 
Students could also contribute something to the debate, such as a particularly illuminating example, 
which is absorbed into how the teacher approaches that topic in future years. It is also true that the 
way a topic is approached will depend on student engagement, and as such, students shape both 
what the subject is and what it will be. For example, in the days when there was a greater scriptural 
emphasis in how religion was studied in schools, it would not have counted as correct in the RS 
classroom to say ‘because of science, religious faith is on shaky ground’, but now, because of student 
interest in Philosophy of Religion, these questions are entertained much more. Indeed, it would now 
be a commonplace thing to utter in the RS classroom and in the right context would get a mark, 
especially if the point was sufficiently justified. 
Religious traditions are clearly central to what is going on in the RS classroom. They provide much of 
the subject matter to be discussed. The role of members of faith groups in the institution is 
therefore very important. That said, whilst what is correct in the RS classroom is informed by the 
content of religious traditions existing independently of or externally to the institution, there is no 
direct route from what is practised, believed or accepted as part of a tradition to what is correct in 
the classroom (i.e. correctness cannot simply be boiled down to ‘being part of a tradition’). One 
reason for this (noted above in footnote 9) is that it is problematic to give an analysis of what it is to 
be ‘traditional’ or ‘part of a tradition’ which corresponds well enough to just what we are looking for 
from the notion of correctness. A more important reason here, however, is that practitioners in the 
RS institution provide a filter, taking information from these traditions (including their own, in some 
cases) and selecting and construing it in a way they deem pedagogically suitable.15 In the teaching of 
Christianity, devotional mantras such as ‘Jesus is my personal friend and saviour’ would not be 
eligible to be judged correct or incorrect, and should therefore be taken to be irrelevant, even if they 
happen to express sentiments held dear by the teacher. 
Practitioners also make additional judgements about how to present the filtered information to 
students of the age and the expectations they cater to. For example, a comparison of the Trinity with 
a shamrock from a five-year old might be welcomed, because it reflects what the institution takes to 
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 Pedagogy is of course an important part of any tradition, as without it, the tradition will die. This 
confessional religious instruction is to be distinguished from the practice of the RS institution, however. The RS 
institution might make use of certain simplifications or examples used in the confessional teaching of the faith, 
but filters which examples would be appropriate for the RS classroom. 
be important to this topic, namely the idea of three things and yet one thing. As a suggestion from a 
student in their late teens, the comparison still focuses on the main issue, but perhaps someone of 
this age would be expected to provide a more complex reflection on the Trinity. 
There is considerable debate within the institution about what it would take for the ‘filter’ to 
function in an acceptable and productive way. We might call to mind Liam Gearon’s observation that 
‘in no other subject do the aims and intentions that underpin the subject vary so greatly’ (2013: 50). 
Gearon identifies six different paradigms for pedagogy in Religious Education, each with different 
methodologies, outlook, modes of assessment and, importantly, aims.16 Whereas some put an aim 
of moral development at the centre of the subject, others prioritise a search for truth. Some want 
religions to be understood and experienced as though from within. For some, learning about religion 
is a means to an end, such as tolerance in society. The different paradigms can be understood as 
different ways of ‘filtering’. The presence of these different paradigms reflects in part the fact that 
there are differences within the institution in what people find interesting, such as texts, 
anthropology of religion, developments in religious history, or particular religions over others. 
But debate over what the aims of the institution are does not show that it is not an institution. For 
these debates take place within the RS institution, between its members. Debate, even 
disagreement, is part of the normal healthy functioning of the institution, allowing for constant self-
evaluation and renewal. Because the RS institution is a network of persons, related to each other in 
various ways, it is no surprise that an uncontentious statement of its aims cannot be given, since 
they cannot be reduced to the aims of any one individual. As such, these observations lend support 
to an institutional understanding of correctness. 
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 1. Scriptural-theological; 2. Phenomenological; 3. Psychological-experiential; 4. Philosophical-conceptual; 5. 
Socio-cultural; 6. Historical-political 
In addition to the fact that practitioners may disagree over what the aims of RS are, the RS 
institution is also constrained by external factors. Governments dictate to a significant extent how 
the RS institution functions, imposing curriculum content or assessment criteria, for example. Of 
course, governments also have the power to preclude state-funded schools to teach Religious 
Studies, such as in the cases of France and the US. International bodies will also exert pressure on 
governments to achieve certain aims in schools, the Toledo Guiding Principles (OSCE (2007)) and the 
REDCo project (see Weisse (2010)) being good examples of this. These colour what is expected of 
the institution, and may influence – rightly or wrongly – what RS does to justify its place on the 
curriculum. Citizenship and tolerance have been high priorities for bodies outside the RS Institution 
in recent years (something which a number of studies, e.g. Gearon (2013) and Erricker (2013) trace 
back, in part at least, to 9/11). As such, external bodies have an indirect impact on what is correct in 
the classroom. Nevertheless, this does not mean the institution is simply being dictated to. We 
should not underestimate the extent to which creative adaptations to these requirements can occur 
within the institution. Neither should we overlook the ways in which the institution can be formative 
of policy through dialogue. Moreover, in the UK, subject specialists are employed to represent both 
government and the RS institution in creating ‘agreed syllabuses’ as benchmarks of best practice in 
the subject. 
Whatever internal conflict exists, and however external pressures change the institution, there is 
enough unity in the way the institution functions to give us some grip on the idea of what proper 
‘filtering’ looks like. The institution imposes certain expectations and experiences on some of its new 
representatives, such as trainee teachers, because it takes these to be a means of learning how to 
‘filter’ information about traditions and how to form and navigate classroom discourse in such a way 
that students acquire what the institution wants them to acquire. These training processes (which 
are not limited to formal qualifications, but include informal, on-the-job training) serve to equip 
people to judge, fairly reliably, what is correct in the classroom – i.e., what the institution is currently 
prepared to treat as correct. It is a feature of the practice of the institution, for example, that being 
an advocate for a tradition is not sufficient to teach it in the context of the RS institution. The way 
the institution functions also makes it the case that subject knowledge is necessary, but not 
sufficient, as it may not be enough to satisfy others of the institution’s aims, e.g. of promoting pupils’ 
understanding of religions, something which requires further communicative skills. 
The key to correctness of judgements is the quality of judges. The RS institution invests considerable 
effort in procedures to regulate how good its teachers and examiners are as judges of correctness. 
Review processes, such as moderation of coursework, ‘seeding’ of examiners’ marks, and the right to 
appeal to a chief examiner play an integral part in this. (Moderation serves both to assess particular 
judges, as well as ensure parity over a cohort of judges.) Even following a nationally examined 
syllabus itself plays a part in regulating practice in the classroom. 
The standards of correctness for sentences uttered in the context of the RS classroom are not 
independent of the training processes designed to enable teachers to recognise those standards. To 
an extent, what is correct is determined by what is recognised as correct by those who have 
undergone the relevant training. This is not the whole story, since the institution can question and 
adjust its training process if they do not generate certain judgements of correctness which the 
institution had a prior commitment to. But it would be artificial to suggest that the standards of 
correctness can be catalogued independently of describing the training processes which lead to 
judgements of correctness. Rather, the two help to construct one another. This is not a worrisome 
circularity, but a bootstrapping typical of living, breathing practices. The institutional approach does 
not have as a consequence that ‘anything goes’ when it comes to correctness. The standard of 
correctness is internal rather than external, which is quite different from there being no standard at 
all. 
None of this means, of course, that correctness and truth are in tension with each other. There is no 
need to say that ‘Khalsa Sikhs wear turbans’ is not correct because it is true. Indeed, we can allow 
that, in this case, its truth has much to do with why it is correct. The RS institution is, after all, 
interested partly in reflecting facts about how religion is practised. That the functioning of the 
institution cannot be reduced to this aim does not mean that this aim plays no role in determining 
what is to be judged correct. 
At the same time, the institutional approach goes some way towards assuaging an anxiety about 
talking in terms of truth, whether stemming from post-modernism, from concerns for political 
correctness, or from elsewhere. This anxiety also has a practical, pedagogical consequence: a worry 
about talking in a way which amounts to asserting the truth or falsehood of religious doctrines in the 
classroom. Our account should be welcomed by those who have such concerns, though it does not 
rely on them. RS professionals can teach secure in the knowledge that articulating robust criteria of 
correctness for the subject does not rest on taking its subject matter to be true.  
Our view that the correctness of a judgement is constituted by its being the kind of judgement that a 
good judge would make is reminiscent of Hume’s treatment of aesthetic judgements in ‘Of the 
Standard of Taste’. Both root the idea of a correct judgement in a description of how a practice 
functions – in Hume’s case, art criticism, and in our case, the RS institution – and what expectations 
of judges characterise that practice. Indeed, we can see the examples we have given as mapping on 
to some of the criteria Hume gives for good judgement, particularly practice, delicacy and lack of 
prejudice. Training can be seen as the RS institution’s way of ensuring that judges meet the 
condition of practice by giving them relevant experience of the material which they are to judge and 
the context in which they are to make such judgements. Training also involves inculcating some of 
the other virtues of the good judge, such as delicacy – an ability to judge in a comparatively nuanced 
and fine-grained way where others may see only the obvious. A teacher who tells students simply 
that kneeling is a ‘holy thing’ to do fails to attend, in making her judgement, to more specific and 
subtle features of the act she is talking about. 
The Humean standard of lack of prejudice may be particularly pertinent in the RS classroom. Note 
that to be ‘prejudiced’ in this case is not necessarily to exhibit bigotry, but to have your judgement 
clouded by your own point of view (regardless of the moral status of that point of view). Hume 
identifies two types of prejudice in the case of art criticism: that which comes from a particular 
perspective, such as geographical location or period in time, and that which comes from having a 
personal stake in propagating a certain view (e.g. a critic’s positive judgement tends not to be taken 
seriously if they are set to profit financially from the success of an artist). The RS institution, 
similarly, expects its judges to be able, as much as possible, to understand a practice in terms of its 
place in a worldview to which it belongs, rather than to fail to comprehend it because it has no place 
in the worldviews familiar from the cultural setting which the practitioner knows. This does not 
mean a good judge should be somehow perspective-less, entirely without situation or context. This 
would not be a reasonable demand of human beings. What is taken to be a reasonable demand is 
that judges should have a kind of openness, the lack of which amounts to a kind of imaginative 
failure. Take, for example, a teacher who is unable to convey the subtlety of Hindu ideas about God 
because they see these ideas only as a denial of the monotheism with which they are familiar. The 
RS institution also expects its judges to act on the interests of the institution rather than out of their 
own personal interests. For example, an aim of getting more young people to Church on Sunday, or 
‘winning souls for God’, would be regarded as compromising a teacher’s judgement were it to 
govern what they cover or what marks they award in the classroom. 
One prospective objection to Hume’s approach to aesthetic appreciation is that it leaves judgements 
of taste ultimately ungrounded. A parallel objection might, then, be made to the institutional 
approach to correctness. Does it make correctness an arbitrary matter, allowing the institution to 
deem whatever it likes correct without deferring at all to the world beyond it? Having given an 
account of who the judges of correctness are, does it still leave hanging the question of what the 
basis of their judgement is? To answer these objections in full would require more space than we 
have here, but we can gesture at what we take to be the right solution. Rather than taking an appeal 
to practitioners (whether members of the RS institution or members of the institution of art 
criticism) to push back the question of the basis of their good judgements, we should take it as 
undercutting that question by replacing an emphasis on the truth of a judgement with an emphasis 
on the practice of judging. The question ‘What do we require of a judgement in order to endorse it?’ 
becomes the question ‘What do we require of a judge in order to trust them on this matter?’. 
While it is an expectation of judges that they should, for the most part, be able to give reasons for 
the particular judgements they make, the strategy we are endorsing suggests that none of these 
reasons translates into a general account of correctness, which is instead to be found in what skills 
we, as a matter of fact, expect from another person if we are to give them credence. As such, an 
institution is not immune from outsiders’ appraisals. If the skills it demands from its representatives 
are found not to match the skills we expect them to have – if, for example, the RS institution allowed 
practitioners to judge correctness in a way which lacked the virtue of delicacy – it will be challenged. 
Many institutions have the possibility of challenge built into their structure through mechanisms for 
external regulation, and, as noted, the RS institution is formally constrained by external factors. But, 
as with other institutions, it is also vulnerable to the informal constraint that an institution can 
become unsustainable, and its standards disallowed, if public dissatisfaction is strong enough. 
There is much more to be said in fully developing and defending the institutional approach. We hope 
at least to have shown that it is worthy of development. The institutional approach tells us how to 
deal with the original question ‘How do you assess that?’. It addresses this in the same way it will 
address the question of what falls within the scope of RS. To answer either question, we look to 
what the practitioners are doing. Just as we would, to find out what counts as mathematics, what 
counts as philosophy, what counts as dressage. Whether we endorse the practice and want it to 
continue is a further question. This approach explains only that there are standards, if the practice 
exists. The practice of RS can, indeed, be problematized by realising that it involves judging 
something to be correct regardless of whether it is believed to be true. But this problem is solved – 
or rather, dissolved – once we think of correctness not as correspondence to a set of standards 
external to the practice, but rather as arising from that practice. Once correctness is seen as internal 
to the practice, then, by explaining how an institution functions, we also specify the basis of its 
criteria of correctness.17 
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